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The idea of a right to privacy for the individual is one that has deep-seated roots in the 
annals of American history, originally hinted at in the fourth amendment of the United 
States Constitution and more formally articulated in the 1890 ​Harvard Law Review 
article “The Right to Privacy” by Warren and Brandeis. The idea has long been the 
subject of much debate; however, given the advent of new and increasingly more 
powerful neuroimaging technologies, I believe a new element must be added to the 
discussion – the idea of the right to cognitive privacy. There are myriad reasons why I 
believe either a reconceptualization of certain rights or a recognition of new rights are 
needed in this domain. My aim with this paper is to briefly address the importance of 
privacy and autonomy in and of themselves, the potential misuse of neuroimaging data 
by those not properly trained in a field which remains in relative infancy, and explore 
the increasing risk to human rights posed by the constantly developing and improving 
field of neuroimaging.  
 
Few people would disagree that an individual’s mind is the most intimate and private 
aspect of a person. A physical body can be subjugated and manipulated in innumerable 
ways, made to seemingly bend to the will of any number of coercive factors. A dictator 
may demand that their subjects all appear in a town square and sing their praises; 
however, they have no way of knowing that person genuinely believes what they are 
saying. As John Bagnell Bury famously opined, “A man can never be hindered from 
thinking whatever he chooses so long as he conceals (Bury, 1913, p. 1).” If we were to 
adopt a Cartesian worldview, affirming the principles of the well-known ​Cogito​, then it 
is fair to posit that the mind is the very thing that lets us know we even exist. In light of 
these qualities of the mind, is it not safe to assume that it deserves some special 
protections? Privacy laws exist with regards to a great number of categories – medical 
information, credit score history, and assorted other relatively mundane classes dealing 
with personally identifiable information.  However, I believe that these laws simply 
failed to anticipate the emergence of neuroscientific advances. If my financial 
information deserves special protections so as to avoid ethical issues, certainly my mind 
does as well. The right to believe what one wishes, to have whatever internal thoughts 
or attitudes they desire free from any external coercion – this is a paramount right, one 
which is essential for respecting the autonomy of a person and which needs to 
recognized as such by the legal system. To prevent a person from independent thinking 
in their most private of spaces is to strip all authenticity away from that person. 
 
The concept of the Panopticon, a system in which prison inmates “were aware of being 
placed under constant surveillance through their own observation of a centrally located 
observation tower (Barker, 1998, p. 59)” was originally put forth by Jeremy Bentham 
and later discussed in more detail by Michel Foucault. In this type of system, merely the 
probability of being observed leads to feelings of subjection and altered behaviour. 
While one may argue that this is appropriate in a disciplinary setting, we begin to 
encounter problems when this “see without being seen” dynamic enters public life. It is 
increasingly common to see video surveillance cameras lining public streets. These 
serve as a Panopticon of sorts, coercing people into behaving a certain way in the 
presence of unverifiable monitoring (Barker, 1998, pp. 60-61). While I believe that this 
is troubling enough on its own, there is a debate beyond the scope of this paper to be 
had that on public property a degree of governmental monitoring is to be expected. 
However, what if these cameras aimed at the public also allow for a view into private 
residences? Should one be expected to remain cognizant of monitoring every time they 
approach their own window, and restrain their behaviour or act in a disingenuous 
fashion for fear of being observed? Certainly one should be free to act as they wish 
within the boundaries of the law in the ostensible privacy of their own home; anything 
less would constitute a gross violation of freedom and natural rights. 
 
Now, let us imagine that in the coming years neuroimaging advances enough to where 
portable machines that can scan the brain of everyone with a certain radius are 
developed. For purposes of discussion, we can assume that these devices result in a 
coherent and accurate tracking of the mind. What if these began appearing on every 
street corner, rather than simply video monitoring devices? If simply being watched can 
cause one to alter their behaviour, what would the effects of knowing your every 
potential thought is subject to scrutiny be? This leads to several difficult issues. Is it 
even possible for one to control their own thoughts? If I were to implore you right now 
to think of absolutely anything except a white elephant, are you able to prevent an 
image of a white elephant from appearing in your head? Moreover, if law enforcement 
were to use neuroimaging to identify brains of those who fall outside the norm, we run 
into the thorny issue of deciding what constitutes normality. No two brains are exactly 
alike, and we would need to seemingly arbitrarily decide what range of deviance from a 
statistical average is allowable (Canli & Amin, 2002, pp. 414-415). Having completed 
this task, we run into the issue of whether or not it is acceptable to act upon someone 
who merely has the potential to commit a crime based on their immutable 
neuroanatomy, regardless of whether or not they've actually done anything wrong. Is 
pre-emptive action ever justified simply because of a neuronal firing sequence or 
imagining of an act when no actual action has been taken? The very act of this type of 
monitoring causes the potential creation of a new class of person – the much maligned 
“thought criminal.” What right could a person have to know the intimate thoughts and 
secrets of another? The mind is thought of as the last bastion of privacy – even under 
constant supervision, one could always take solace in their own thoughts. Imagine an 
alternate history where the Nazi party of Holocaust era Germany had access to 
incredibly accurate neuroimaging methods. If they were to visit the house of someone 
they suspected was harbouring a Jewish family, that person would not even be able to 
lie and say they were doing no such thing. I firmly believe that people have a right to 
mental privacy, lest we fall into the realm of tyranny often depicted in dystopian novels 
 
Potential dystopian futures reached with perfect neuroimaging technology aside, there 
exist a slew of practical modern day ethical issues. I believe there is a great deal of 
ignorance regarding both the capabilities and interpretation of neuroimaging data among 
laypeople. As it stands, “compiling and interpreting brain-imaging data requires highly 
specialized skills in neuropsychology, physics, and statistics (Wolpe, Foster, & 
Langleben, 2005, p. 42).” Despite this, the CEO of a given company may read a popular 
science article in a newspaper about the magic of fMRI technology, and decide that 
fMRI scans should be a prerequisite for employment. Having fallen prey to the 
phenomenon of neurorealism (Racine, Bar-Ilan, & Illes, 2005, p. 162), they may 
mistakenly believe that this will provide a fool proof way to screen for potential 
negative qualities, such as a predilection towards theft, laziness, dishonesty, et cetera. 
While this is likely to lead to poor or misinformed hiring decisions on its own, it also 
leads to other deleterious consequences. In its current state, many of the results provided 
by neuroimaging may not accurately be showing what they purport to. In light of this, it 
seems questionable to deny someone employment based on what the untrained person 
suspects is neural evidence of lying, or uncooperative behaviour. Moreover, what if the 
person performing the imaging were to detect something which was grounds for 
medical concern? Are they obligated to inform the applicant, even though they have no 
formal medical training? If they opt to inform of the potential medical risk and are 
mistaken, they may be liable for any emotional stress or financial strain placed on the 
subject when they seek medical attention. If they opt not to divulge the information and 
the subject later suffers medical consequences, they may be held responsible for that 
person’s condition.  These issues could be altogether alleviated with the recognition that 
private thoughts and cognition are protected data, not subject to monitoring for the sake 
of convenience. It would be considered altogether unreasonable for someone to demand 
access to the e-mail accounts or recorded phone conversation of a potential hire, and 
even this would be less grievous an offense than demanding to see the inner most 
workings of their mind. 
 
It is overwhelmingly clear using our simple human reason and rationality that a natural 
right to cognitive privacy exists, commensurate with those other undeniable rights 
which allow us to lead an authentic and autonomic life of freedom. What we must now 
pursue is a legal recognition of this right. Current protections regarding privacy have 
become archaic in light of the technological progress we have made and will continue to 
make, and will only become more so unless they are revisited from a fresh and modern 
perspective. Numerous special conditions as well as overwhelming importance make 
cognitive privacy an issue unique from that in privacy as a whole, and it is imperative 
that we address it appropriately.  
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